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ABSTRACT 
Kim Dotcom, founder of Megaupload Limited, has been in 
many news headlines over the past year. Megaupload—one of 
Dotcom’s many peer-to-peer sharing sites—was the center of 
controversy, as it allowed users to upload and share all sorts of 
files, including copyrighted material. After an organized effort by 
the Department of Justice and several foreign governments, 
Dotcom was arrested for (secondary) copyright infringement and 
his site was ultimately shut down.  
Dotcom has recently launched a new service, MEGA, which he 
claims will evade copyright laws entirely. Like other well-known 
cloud-sharing services such as Dropbox and Google Drive, MEGA 
allows users to upload files and to share them with select users. In 
an attempt to avoid liability, MEGA locally encrypts all files on the 
user’s computer before they are uploaded to the site. The private 
key and public key used to encrypt and decrypt the file are retained 
solely by the user; MEGA gets no part of that information. This, 
Dotcom argues, will shift the entirety of the copyright onus to the 
user.  
This Issue Brief analyzes the protections afforded cyberlocker 
services like MEGA by the DMCA, including tensions raised in 
actual litigation. This Issue Brief argues that, while an ex ante 
secondary-liability analysis is difficult due to its contextual nature, 
MEGA’s use of user-controlled encryption (UCE), deduplication, 
and distributed host servers may lend to an affirmative finding of 
liability. 
INTRODUCTION 
The advance of technology has presented new difficulties in the 
interpretation and application of copyright law. The most problematic 
advances are those that have brought copyright infringement to the masses. 
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Proprietors of such technologies can distribute devices or provide services 
that have the capability to infringe copyright, without directly infringing 
themselves and thereby evading copyright liability. To address this 
problem, courts have fashioned secondary liability to impose liability on 
these individuals. 
Most recently, peer-to-peer (P2P) services have come under 
scrutiny because they allow third-party users to infringe copyright without 
directly involving the service provider in that infringement. Such 
technologies include Napster, Grokster, Morpheus, and Limewire, among 
others. Although the law has developed around these P2P services,
1
 a new 
type of technology has emerged that could test the metes and bounds of this 
judge-made law: digital storage lockers, also known as cyberlockers. 
Cyberlockers allow users to store files in the cloud,
2
 either for personal use 
or to be distributed to other users. Cyberlockers do not employ any filtering 
mechanisms. Rather, users are able to upload and share whatever material 
they choose—including potentially copyrighted material. 
Among the newest of these is Kim Dotcom’s MEGA cyberlocker.3 
Dotcom gained Internet notoriety through the rise and fall of his earlier 
cyberlocker service, Megaupload.
4
 Allegedly accounting for 4 percent of 
total Internet traffic,
5
 the site was shut down by the U.S. Department of 
Justice in early 2012.
6
 Although copyright-infringement charges have been 
brought against Dotcom,
7
 he has nonetheless launched a new cyberlocker 
service, MEGA.
8
 Unlike its previous iteration, the new MEGA site offers 
several key features: user-controlled encryption, deduplication, and 
distributed hosting.
9
 Although all cyberlockers employ some form of 
                                                     
1
 See, e.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (applying the 
doctrine of intentional inducement). 
2
 See Jonathan Strickland, How Cloud Storage Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/cloud-computing/cloud-storage.htm (last  
visited Oct. 25, 2013) (explaining cloud storage). 
3
 MEGA HOME PAGE, https://mega.co.nz/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
4
 Lucy Craymer, Kim Dotcom Launches New Version of Megaupload, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan.19, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873239 
68304578251752248253048.html. 
5
 Matt Tooley, Megaupload Gets Shut Down, SANDVINE: THE BETTER BROADBAND 
BLOG (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.betterbroadbandblog.com/2012/01/megaupload-
gets-shut-down/. 
6
 Id. 
7
 Indictment, United States v. Kim Dotcom, No. 1:12CR3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/documents/mega 
upload_indictment.pdf. 
8
 Craymer, supra note 4. 
9
 MEGA HELP CENTRE, https://mega.co.nz/#help_security (last visited Mar. 9, 
2013). See Lee Hutchinson, Megabad: A quick look at the state of Mega’s 
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encryption to protect their users’ data, MEGA does not store any of the 
encryption keys on its servers, preventing it from identifying the encrypted 
information.
10
 
An analysis of MEGA’s potential liability may provide guidance to 
other cyberlockers that are evaluating potential liability issues. This Issue 
Brief proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses the common-law development 
of secondary liability doctrine. Part II examines the DMCA’s safe harbor 
for qualifying internet service providers. Finally, Part III considers several 
key tensions between those safe-harbor provisions and secondary liability, 
before applying the legal standards to cyberlockers such as MEGA.  
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SECONDARY LIABILITY 
Copyright law grants six exclusive rights to copyright holders,
11
 
subject to various limitations.
12
 Historically, copyright holders could only 
enforce their rights against direct infringers.
13
 That limitation became 
problematic when casual copyright infringement, using technology 
available to consumers, became possible.
14
 Rather than pursue the 
consumers, copyright holders went after the source—the proprietors of the 
new technologies, against whom an injunction would be far more effective, 
and, not coincidentally, who had deeper pockets to pay damages. This 
section will discuss how courts addressed the concerns of rights holders by 
developing the doctrine of secondary infringement. 
A.  Sony and the Creation of Contributory Infringement 
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
15
 the 
Supreme Court held that proprietors of technologies that could be used to 
infringe copyright could be held secondarily liable for infringement 
committed by their users.
16
 The Court was confronted with Sony’s Betamax 
video tape recorders (VTRs),
17
 which gave owners the ability to record 
                                                                                                                       
encryption, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 21, 2013 10:22 AM), http://arstechnica.com/ 
business/2013/01/megabad-a-quick-look-at-the-state-of-megas-encryption/, for an 
explanation and analysis of the encryption schemes employed by MEGA. 
10
 MEGA: THE PRIVACY COMPANY, https://mega.co.nz/#privacycompany (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
11
 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
12
 See, e.g., §§ 107–112. 
13
 See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 51 (2008) (“In the world of the 1950s . . 
. [i]t was assumed by many that copyright need not and probably should not 
regulate private, noncommercial acts.”). 
14
 Id. 
15
 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
16
 See id. at 435. 
17
 Id. at 422. 
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shows on television while being present, away, or watching another show.
18
 
Universal Studios and Walt Disney Productions, worried about the effect 
the technology would have on the commercial value of their copyrights, 
filed suit, seeking both damages and an injunction to prevent Sony from 
manufacturing and marketing the Betamax.
19
  
The crux of the problem was that “[t]he Copyright Act does not 
expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another.”20 
Borrowing from patent law’s concept of contributory infringement, 21 the 
Court explained that in order for liability to be imposed on Sony, “it must 
rest on the fact that they have sold equipment with constructive knowledge 
of the fact that their customers may use the equipment to make unauthorized 
copies of copyrighted material.”22 The Court was careful to limit the 
principle of contributory infringement to instances where the technology is 
not capable of “commercially significant noninfringing uses.”23 Moreover, 
the Court did not believe it had to “give precise content to the question of 
how much use is commercially significant.”24  
B.  Vicarious Liability and Inducement Liability 
In addition to contributory infringement, two other forms of liability 
exist for potential secondary infringers: vicarious liability and inducement 
liability. Although the Sony Court used the term “vicarious” and 
“contributory” interchangeably, the doctrine of vicarious liability did not 
                                                     
18
 Id. 
19
 See id. at 420–25. 
20
 Id. at 434. Unlike previous contributory-infringement cases, Sony’s “only contact 
between [itself] and the users of the Betamax . . . occurred at the moment of the 
sale.” Id. at 438. 
21
 See id. at 439 (“There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition 
of vicarious liability on such a theory. The closest analogy is provided by the patent 
law cases . . . .”) 
22
 Id. In Sony, the Court did not distinguish clearly between contributory and 
vicarious liability. See id. 
23
 See id. at 442. 
24
 Id. Both parties had presented “surveys of the way the Betamax” was used, which 
showed that the “primary using of the machine . . . was ‘time-shifting’—the 
practice of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and thereafter 
erasing it.” Id. at 423. Sony’s surveys also indicated that “7.3% of all Betamax use 
is to record sports events, and representatives of professional [sports] testified that 
they had no objection to the recording of their televised events for home use.” Id. at 
424. This use, among other “private, noncommercial time-shifting” uses was 
sufficient to meet the Court’s standard of “commercially significant noninfringing 
uses.” See id. at 442. 
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arise until much later.
25
 In 2005, the Court explained that one may be held 
liable for vicarious infringement when he “profit[s] from direct 
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”26 
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the 
Supreme Court addressed a new form of liability that can also attach to 
secondary infringers, including P2P service providers: inducement 
liability.
27
 Once again borrowing from patent-law principles, the Court held 
that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement 
by third parties.”28 To prevent the newly formed principle from restricting 
the development of new technologies, the Court was careful to limit its 
application.
29
 First, “mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual 
infringing uses” is insufficient to establish liability.30 Second, “ordinary acts 
incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical 
support or product updates” is similarly insufficient.31 
C.  The DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions  
Congress enacted four safe harbors to allow technological 
proprietors to continue to innovate with immunity from secondary liability 
as long as they followed certain procedures to limit the infringement taking 
place on their systems and services.
32
 One provision grants qualifying 
service providers
33
 protection for “Information Residing on Systems or 
Networks at Directions of Users.”34 Specifically, such providers are not 
liable for copyright infringement “by reason of the storage at the direction 
of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or 
                                                     
25
 As the Ninth Circuit explained in A&M Records, Inc.v. Napster, Inc., “[v]icarious 
copyright liability is an ‘outgrowth’ of respondeat superior . . . extend[ing] beyond 
an employer/employee relationship.” 229 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
26
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). 
27
 Id. at 936. 
28
 See id. at 936–37. 
29
 Id. at 937. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. 
32
 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2012). 
33
 “Service providers” under the statute are more than just those who provide 
internet service; they are any “entit[ies] offering the transmission, routing, or 
providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among 
points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification 
to the content of the material as sent or received.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2012).  
34
 § 512(c). 
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operated by or for the service provider.”35 However, the safe harbor only 
applies if the service provider: 
(A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity 
using the material on the system or network is infringing;  
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts 
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the 
right and ability to control such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in 
paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access 
to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject 
of infringing activity.36 
Additionally, the DMCA requires service providers to implement a repeat-
infringer policy.
37
 Finally, DMCA safe harbors do not require service 
providers to “monitor[] [their] service[s] or affirmatively seek[] facts 
indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with” the 
service’s repeat-infringer policy.38 
II. ADDRESSING ISSUES WITHIN THE DMCA 
Two important issues that remain unclear are whether the DMCA 
safe harbor applies in cases of inducement liability
39
 and whether the actual 
and “red flag” knowledge provisions require indication of “specific and 
identifiable infringements.”40 
                                                     
35
 § 512(c)(1). 
36
 §§ 512(c)(1)(A)–(C). 
37
 § 512(i)(1)(A) (requiring a policy “that provides for the termination in 
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service 
provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers”). 
38
 See § 512(m)(1). 
39
 See generally R. Anthony Reese, The Relationship Between the ISP Safe Harbors 
and Liability for Inducement, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 8. The safe harbor was 
implemented before the Supreme Court created inducement liability in Grokster.  
40
 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation 
marks omitted). “Red flag” knowledge refers to § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
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A.  The DMCA’s Application to Inducement Liability 
Various theories have been presented suggesting that inducement 
liability precludes application of the DMCA safe harbors.
41
 First, Congress 
did not anticipate the DMCA’s application to inducement liability because 
the DMCA was enacted before the Grokster opinion created such liability.
42
 
Second, the DMCA “safe harbors are based on passive good faith conduct 
at operating a legitimate Internet business” while inducement liability is 
based on “active bad faith conduct promoting infringement.”43 However, 
these two ideas cannot be reconciled with the history and application of the 
DMCA. This section evaluates these positions and discusses how 
inducement liability may coexist with the DMCA safe harbors even though 
these two arguments fail.  
Contrary to the first argument, the safe harbors were created to 
withstand the development of other, additional secondary liability 
schemes.
44
 Congress anticipated that the law of copyright would evolve and 
chose to create a series of safe harbors rather than codify existing standards 
of secondary liability.
45
 Furthermore, the safe harbors explicitly state that 
“service provider[s] shall not be liable . . . for infringement of copyright” 
without predicating such protection on a particular type of infringement.
46
 
Although some courts have considered the DMCA a restatement of existing 
forms of liability,
47
 others have found that such a reading would limit 
Congress’ purpose in establishing safe harbors as an evolving tool.48 
With respect to the second argument, it is at least plausible that a 
finding of inducement infringement would not preclude safe harbor under 
the DMCA. Although inducement often looks to a service provider’s 
actions in promoting infringement and the DMCA requires good-faith, 
passive conduct in determining protection, inducement may not “necessarily 
                                                     
41
 See generally Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122661 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009). 
42
 See Daniel Kohler, A Question of Intent: Why Inducement Liability Should 
Preclude Protection Under the Safe Harbor Provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 41 SW. L. REV. 487, 490 (2012).  
43
 Fung, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122661, at *67–68. 
44
 See YouTube, 676 F.3d at 27. 
45
 See id. 
46
 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2012). 
47
 See Fung, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122661, at *57 (“In many ways, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act is simply a restatement of the legal standards 
establishing secondary copyright infringement . . . .”). 
48
 YouTube, 676 F.3d at 27. 
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be limited to . . . active, bad-faith conduct.”49 For example, under one 
particular reading of Grokster, it is feasible that any online service provider 
whose service is capable of infringement may be liable for inducement.
50
 A 
categorical exclusion of DMCA protection would, therefore, impose 
liability on service providers in instances where Congress sought to protect 
technological innovators.
51
 Instead, the DMCA’s protections can be limited 
to service providers that do not possess “red flag” knowledge of 
infringement.
52
 The ISP safe harbor’s “red flag” knowledge provision 
would preclude protection for “service provider[s] who actively encourage[] 
users to infringe [because they] will likely at least be ‘aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.’”53  
B. The Appropriate Standard of Knowledge  
The ISP safe-harbor provision’s requisite standard of knowledge 
poses an additional problem to be resolved. The ISP safe harbor applies 
unless the service provider has “actual knowledge” or is “aware of facts or 
circumstances” of infringing activity.54 Additionally, service providers must 
“upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, act expeditiously to remove 
. . . the material.”55 As the YouTube court correctly pointed out, “the nature 
of the removal obligation itself contemplates knowledge or awareness of 
specific infringing material, because expeditious removal is possible only if 
the service provider knows with particularity which items to remove.”56 
With respect to the “actual knowledge” requirement, a specificity standard 
is clear, but whether such a specificity standard can be applied to the “red 
flag” requirement poses a dilemma. Arguably, the “red flag” provision of 
the ISP safe harbor would become superfluous with the specificity 
                                                     
49
 See, e.g., Reese, supra note 39, at 16–17 (arguing service providers that have 
“substantial certainty” of infringing activity on their services may be found to be 
contributorily liable).  
50
 See id. at 17 (“After all, some of the provider's users are almost certain to store 
infringing material, at least if the provider's service attracts any substantial number 
of users.”). 
51
 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998) (“The Committee . . . believes it is 
important . . . to understand the practical implications of th[e] relationship [between 
intellectual property and electronic commerce] on the development of technology to 
be used in promoting electronic commerce.”). 
52
 See id. at 24. 
53
 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006)). 
54
 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
55
 § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
56
 YouTube, 676 F.3d at 30. 
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requirement because knowledge or awareness of specific infringing material 
would also establish the “actual knowledge” provision.57 
The YouTube court held that the difference between the “actual 
knowledge” and “red flag” requirements was between a subjective and 
objective belief, respectively.
58
 Because the “red flag” provision 
“incorporates an objective standard,” it was distinguished from the actual 
knowledge provision such that both could “do independent work and both 
[could] apply only to specific instances of infringement.”59 The Ninth 
Circuit in UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capital Partners, on the other hand, 
agreed that a specificity requirement existed with respect to infringing 
material, but found no distinction between its application to the “actual 
knowledge” and “red flag” requirements.60 Instead, that court held that “the 
burden remains with the copyright holder rather [than] the service provider” 
to show specific infringing material because service providers do not have a 
duty to actively search for such material.
61
 
The Ninth Circuit’s reluctance to distinguish between the “actual 
knowledge” and “red flag” requirements with respect to a finding of 
specific infringing material was largely due to its reluctance to impose any 
duty to monitor for infringing material.
62
 Such a duty, it said, would run 
afoul of the safe harbor provisions.
63
 However, in so doing, the Ninth 
Circuit rendered both provisions substantially similar, if not identical.
64
 The 
YouTube court’s construction avoids such a problem. Moreover, it allows 
for liability in situations when the service provider is subjectively unaware 
of specific infringement but aware of facts that would otherwise indicate 
such a finding to a reasonable person.
65
 Providing such a flexible standard 
protects the rights of copyright holders while balancing the interests of and 
protections granted to technology proprietors. 
                                                     
57
 See id. at 31. 
58
 See id. The court explained, “the actual knowledge provision turns on whether 
the provider actually or ‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement, while the “red 
flag” provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that 
would have made the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable 
person.” Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 667 F.3d 1022, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2011). 
61
 See id. at 1038. 
62
 See id. 
63
 See id. at 1041; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2012). 
64
 The YouTube court was worried precisely about this: rendering the “red flag” 
provision superfluous. 
65
 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012). 
160 MEGA, DIGITAL STORAGE LOCKERS [Vol. 12 
 
 
C.  Does MEGA Evade Liability? 
The determination of copyright liability—direct and secondary—is 
largely contextually driven and an ex ante analysis of potential liability for a 
new technology may only provide limited guidance. Without the benefit of 
discovery, evidence that would establish liability or support protection 
under the DMCA remains in the sole province of the technological 
proprietor. This section will address whether MEGA’s cyberlocker 
implementation of various methods might foreclose protection under the 
DMCA.
66
  
MEGA’s use of user-controlled encryption is unique among 
cyberlockers. MEGA boasts that using UCE will provide greater security 
and protection for users of its service over other cyberlockers. However, 
because MEGA’s predecessor was largely infamous (and ultimately shut 
down) for copyright infringement, courts may view UCE as evidence of an 
attempt to circumvent the requisite knowledge or awareness under the 
DMCA ISP safe harbor. At least one court has addressed the use of 
encryption technology in a P2P service. In In re Aimster Copyright 
Litigation,
67
 the Seventh Circuit held that the use of encryption technology 
in a P2P music-sharing service could not shield the creator from 
knowledge.
68
 Instead, the court found that the use of encryption amounts to 
willful blindness, which would be sufficient to meet the knowledge 
requirement for contributory infringement.
69
 In YouTube, the Second Circuit 
noted that although the DMCA does not “‘speak directly’ to the willful 
blindness doctrine, . . . [it] may be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to 
demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement 
under the DMCA.”70 It is likely that other courts would subscribe to this 
analysis because the doctrine of “willful blindness . . . is hardly [a] novel” 
concept and would prevent an infringer from “shield[ing] itself from 
                                                     
66
 Whether cyberlockers can be exempt from liability under fair use, 17 U.S.C. § 
107 (2012), is outside the scope of this Issue Brief. 
67
 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
68
 Id. at 650–51. 
69
 See id. (“Our point is only that a service provider that would otherwise be a 
contributory infringer does not obtain immunity by using encryption to shield itself 
from actual knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service is being 
used.”); see also YouTube, 676 F.3d at 35 (“A person is ‘willfully blind’ or engages 
in ‘conscious avoidance amounting to knowledge where the person ‘was aware of a 
high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided that fact.’” (quoting 
United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
70
 YouTube, 676 F.3d at 34–35 (quoting Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 
2009)). 
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learning of the particular infringing transactions by looking the other 
way.”71 
If evidence suggests that MEGA implemented UCE for more than 
just security, but rather to evade knowledge of infringing activity, the 
provider may be found to be willfully blind, thereby imputing the requisite 
level of knowledge that would require removal of the infringing material 
under the DMCA. Such a finding may even be supported by MEGA’s use 
of deduplication.
72
 Although deduplication may be used for efficiency 
gains,
73
 the use of UCE coupled with deduplication means that each file 
uploaded onto the service provider may be viewed as its own stand-alone 
file. For copyright holders, this presents a vexing problem: Each piece of 
copyrighted material that gets uploaded to the service would require a 
separate takedown notice. Because service providers have no duty to 
monitor their service and the application of UCE greatly restricts a service 
provider’s ability to do so, copyright holders would face an uphill battle 
against third party infringers using the service. Again, such a scheme may 
support a finding that MEGA possesses the requisite “red flag” knowledge 
under the DMCA.
74
 
Another unique issue with respect to MEGA’s service is its use of 
distributed host servers.
75
 Whether MEGA “receive[s] a financial benefit 
directly attributable to the infringing activity” can only be determined 
through the course of litigation.
76
 Often, a service provider’s business model 
will help establish whether there is a direct link between the financial 
benefit and the infringing activity.
77
 Like many other cyberlockers, MEGA 
offers both free and premium services. The premium services, which 
                                                     
71
 See id. at 35 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 
2009)). 
72
 Deduplication is a process of removing duplicated data on a server. For example, 
if two users update the identical file, one may be deleted and the user of that file 
will be given a reference to the original. See Rick Vanover, Storage-based 
compression and deduplication overview, TECHREPUBLIC (Nov. 13, 2009, 1:41 
PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/datacenter/storage-based-compression-
and-de-duplication-overview (explaining data deduplication). 
73
 For example, the removal of duplicated data saves decreases server storage space. 
Id. 
74
 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
75
 MEGA allows host partners to provide servers to support its service. MEGA 
HOSTING PARTNERS, https://mega.co.nz/#hosting (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
76
 See § 512(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
77
 See, e.g., Reese, supra note 39, at 20 (“[T]he Court viewed the defendants’ 
business model as a ‘complement’ to direct evidence in the record of unlawful 
intent to encourage infringement . . . .”); Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, The Moral of 
the Story: What Grokster Has to Teach About the DMCA, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 6. 
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charges users a fee based on data storage, does not immediately trigger 
suspicion that there is a link between the financial benefit and the infringing 
material. More troubling is MEGA’s use of distributed host servers. 
Although it possesses its own servers, MEGA allows third parties to act as 
servers for storage of content.
78
 MEGA claims this ensures that data stored 
on its service will be available even if one or more of its servers goes 
down.
79
 It is unclear what level of control MEGA maintains over these host 
servers; presumably it is able to exert some form of control over host 
servers if it is able to comply with takedown notices. Even so, as the 
YouTube court made clear, the “right and ability to control” must be 
“something more” than traditional vicarious liability.80 Here, the court’s 
inclusion of inducement as evidence of such control would be particularly 
telling. Specifically, courts may find that MEGA’s use of UCE, 
deduplication, and distributed host servers were all “affirmative steps taken 
to foster infringement.”81 
CONCLUSION 
Even if MEGA does not qualify for DMCA protection, courts 
would be prudent to limit their holding to MEGA’s service (and others like 
it). An overbroad application may hamper the development of new 
technologies, including next-generation cyberlockers—a goal that runs 
afoul of Congress’ purpose in establishing the DMCA.82 Although many of 
the mechanisms MEGA employs may exist in a gray area between 
protection and infringement, they are not entirely unique to MEGA. 
Cyberlockers all maintain their own standards for addressing infringement, 
deduplication, encryption, and file hosting. MEGA’s decision to employ 
certain schemes should not be considered to violate the DMCA 
requirements solely because of its predecessor site’s bad media image, but 
instead, because there is a direct showing that the current service was 
developed and employed in a manner that violates the DMCA and 
secondary-infringement principles.  
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